Introduction: Proximal and Distal Stimuli

The central premise of empiricism is knowledge is obtained through our senses but the debate concerning the evidence and what type of sensory stimuli is necessary for our empirical knowledge still rages on . In order for one to be justified in what they believe or claim to know then they must have some type of evidence for their justification to have any sort of validity; therefore, in the case of empirical knowledge the evidence must be sensory evidence of some sort but exactly what type of sensory evidence provides justification for our beliefs and knowledge has puzzled epistemologists down through the ages. Within the analytic tradition, for a considerable amount of their philosophical careers W.V. Quine and Donald Davidson debated back and forth about what kind of sensory stimuli was evidence for human empirical knowledge. For W.V. Quine empirical knowledge was gained via sensory stimulation such as our retinas being irradiated by various wavelengths of visible light whenever a rabbit runs by and this type of proximal stimulation which is stimulation which occurs at the point at which the stimuli comes in contact with human sensory receptors and it was this type of stimulation that counts as evidence. Donald Davidson, on the other hand, argued that evidential stimuli should not be located proximally but with objects out in the external world which cause our experiences and this he called distal stimulation. The reason behind Davidson’s theory of distal stimuli was that he believed Quine’s proximal account led to skepticism because even though our sensory organs are being stimulated, if our evidentiary stimulus is purely proximal then we will encounter the ‘brain-in-a-vat’ problem. While I agree with Davidson that our evidentiary stimuli must be distal, proximal stimulation can be easily dismissed because, as I will argue, without proximal stimulation objective empirical knowledge would be impossible. It is my thesis, therefore, to provide an account which can account for both types of stimulation which in the end can (if not avoid skepticism) at least provide a plausible answer to possible skeptical worries about the evidential bases for empiricism knowledge.