An Anti-Coherentism Regress and a Response

Introduction
In “The Raft and the Pyramid” Ernest Sosa presents an infinite regress against coherentism and now coherentists, at one time thinking that they were immune from any infinite regresses, have found themselves in philosophical crosshairs of one. I believe that Laurence BonJour offered a possible, though controversial, solution to Sosa’s regress that he entitled the doxastic presumption. It is my thesis to show how BonJour’s doxastic presumption is one possible solution to Sosa’s regress argument and to defend it against an objection made by Paul Moser.

Sosa’s Regress Argument
In order for a belief to be justified a coherence theory of justification requires the following:

C. For a subject S to have a justified belief B, B is justified if and only if B is a member of a coherent set of beliefs C and the likelihood of B being true is greater than the likelihood of B being false.
Sosa argues that a coherentist would likely accept the following:

A. “A belief B is foundationally justified for S in virtue of having property F only if S is justified in believe (1) that most at least of his beliefs with property F are true, and (2) that B has property F. But this means that belief B is not foundational after all, and indeed that the very notion of (empirical) foundational belief is incoherent.” (155)

Examining (A) we see that (C) satisfies its criteria; (A(1)) is satisfied since all the beliefs within a coherent system are likely to be true given that they possess property F and (A(2)) is satisfied because property F would be the property of B belonging to a coherent set of beliefs. However, Sosa states that if a coherentist accepts (A) then they seem bound to accept the following premise that he labels as A′:

A′. “A belief X is justified for S in virtue of membership in a coherent set only if S is justified in believing (1) that most at least of his beliefs with the property thus cohering are true, and (2) that X has that property.

…But A′ is a quicksand of endless depth” (155). Sosa’s reasoning is that now (A′(1)) needs to justified. Sosa’s regress argument specifically targets metabeliefs that are beliefs about the coherence and truth of one’s set of beliefs. However, as Sosa points out that for any such metabelief to be justified there will need to be a meta-metabelief to justify it, ad infinitum. To offer a solution to this problem I turn to BonJour’s doxastic presumption.

The Doxastic Presumption
In §5.4 of The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Laurence BonJour developed a possible strategy to counter any possible regress by introducing the doxastic presumption in order to prevent an infinite regress of metabeliefs from starting. In the initial stages of constructing his coherence theory BonJour needed to establish how an individual is justified in believing that their beliefs are coherent and true. BonJour did accept (C) and given that beliefs are justified only by their coherence with other beliefs, “What we must now ask is whether and how the fact that a belief coheres in this way is cognitively accessible to the believer himself, so that it can give him a reason for accepting the belief” (BonJour, Structure 101). Given this internalist thesis it is reasonable to ask, ‘How are our metabeliefs (i.e., reasons) justified?’ We cannot appeal to any type coherence because any such appeal would be viciously circular; we cannot appeal to externalism because then the coherence theory could collapse into foundationalism; and we cannot appeal to further metabeliefs and thus fall into Sosa’s regress. Therefore, we need to establish how an individual can have a justified metabelief about the coherence and truth of their beliefs.
“…the primary justification issue is whether or not, under the presumption that I do indeed hold approximately the system of beliefs which I believe myself to hold, those beliefs are justified. And thus the suggested solution to the problem raised in this section is that the grasp of my system of beliefs which is required if I am to have cognitive access to the fact of coherence is dependent…on this Doxastic Presumption, as I will call it, rather than requiring further justification.” (BonJour, Structure 103)
The doxastic presumption is a transcendental argument because in BonJour’s theory it is not a premise but, “…a basis and unavoidable feature of cognitive practice” (Structure 104). If any type of justification is to begin then we must assume some necessary conditions, such as assuming that one’s beliefs are coherent and mostly true. Without the doxastic presumption it is difficult to see how any type of epistemic justification can begin because when we represent our beliefs via introspection we must presume that this representation is coherent and largely true. If we did not make this presumption then we would be trapped within a form of skepticism concerning the coherence and truth our own beliefs. If our justificatory starting point is a form of skepticism then it is difficult to see how any form of epistemic justification can begin.
“Thus the Doxastic Presumption does not, strictly speaking, function at all in the normal workings of the cognitive system. Rather it simply describes or formulates, from the outside, something that I unavoidably do: I assume that the beliefs constituting my overall grasp of my system of beliefs are, by and large, correct.” (BonJour, Structure 105)
Since the doxastic presumption is not a metabelief but a presumption that we, as cognitive individuals, necessarily utilize we are not caught in an infinite regress of metabeliefs. Now turning to Sosa’s regress argument; recalling (A′) , what led to the regress was (A′(1)); if we employ BonJour’s doxastic presumption, no further metabeliefs are necessary because part of our cognitive practice is to presume that our system of beliefs is coherent and largely true. Therefore, a coherentist can accept (C) as well as (A) and (A′) of Sosa’s argument but the doxastic presumption becomes the justificatory terminus thus preventing an infinite regress from starting.
Turning now to an objection, in “Internalism and Coherence: A Dilemma”, Paul Moser made several objections against BonJour but the objection I want to focus on is his argument that the doxastic presumption is ad hoc, “…because its sole purpose is to save BonJour's coherentism from the aforementioned infinite regress problem generated by its internalism” (Moser 163). BonJour replied to Moser’s objection in a subsequent article entitled “Reply to Moser”, and concerning this particular objection, BonJour states that reasonably one may ask, ‘Why the appeal to the doxastic presumption since it cannot prove that beliefs within a coherence system of beliefs are likely to be true?’ BonJour answers that if one were to reject the doxastic presumption or any type of background assumptions about the likelihood that one’s beliefs are true then, “…any epistemological view is inadequate when judged by such a standard” (“Reply” 165). If we recall BonJour’s argument that whenever we represent our beliefs via introspection, we make the presumption that that representation is true and coherent and from this initial presumption we begin our inquiry into whether or not our beliefs are justified. If we start our justificatory inquiry from a skeptical position (e.g., we are not justified in believing anything derived via introspection) then whether one is a coherentist or foundationalist, any form of epistemic justification is going to be elusive. The doxastic presumption is required for epistemic justification; therefore, the doxastic presumption is not ad hoc but necessary for epistemic justification.

Concluding Remarks
To recapitulate, Sosa’s regress argument against coherentism states that for any metabelief about the coherence and truth of one’s set of beliefs, that metabelief needs to be justified by a meta-metabelief but this justificatory chain goes ad infinitum. To address this BonJour introduced the doxastic presumption to stop this regress because the doxastic presumption is not a metabelief but a necessary presumption that an individual makes concerning the truth and coherence of their beliefs if any justification is to begin. If the doxastic presumption is rejected on the basis that it is ad hoc then any attempt to justify our beliefs is hindered because we would be trapped within skepticism.
 
Work Cited
BonJour, Laurence. “Reply to Moser.” Analysis 48.4 (1988):164-165. JSTOR. 21 Sept. 2009.
---. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.
Moser, Paul. “Internalism and Coherence: A Dilemma.” Analysis 48.4 (1988):161-163. JSTOR. 19 Sept. 2009.
Sosa, Ernest. “The Raft and the Pyramid.” Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd Ed. 2000. Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, et al. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Company, 2008. 145-164.

Nobel Peace Prize to Obama?

I hope someday I will actually have something positive to say about this Administration and President Obama but whenever I was read this morning that Obama had won the Nobel Peace Prize, I couldn't help but shake my head. From FoxNews.Com:

The Norwegian Nobel Committee lauded the change in global mood wrought by Obama's calls for peace and cooperation but recognized initiatives that have yet to bear fruit: reducing the world stock of nuclear arms, easing American conflicts with Muslim nations and strengthening the U.S. role in combating climate change.

"Only very rarely has a person to the same extent as Obama captured the world's attention and given its people hope for a better future," said Thorbjoern Jagland, chairman of the Nobel Committee.

So really the Nobel Peace Prize has been awarded to Obama not on what he has done, but what he said he will do, in other words, Obama has not done anything to earn it expect for making a bunch of promises that leaders from other nations have throughout the past few years. Forgive me, but I thought the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded on actual merits and achievements, not a bunch of speeches and promises.

The comment from Thorbjoern Jagland made me chuckle because it remains me, in a way, to what people were saying about Obama during the campaign season. Many people that I talked to did not really know what Obama wanted to do or how he was going to do it, but all they really knew what that he was a great speaker, liked what he said, and he gave them hope. However, when I pressed them into gave reasons why they like what Obama is going to do, i.e., his policies, they could not answer me, but resorted to their fondness of his speeches, and they felt "hopeful." I guess Jagland is the same way; who care what Obama is really doing, so long as he says it well (which as we know, without a teleprompter Obama can't give a speech).

Personally, I don't feel "hopeful" and what is interesting there are some countries in this world, particularly Israel, Poland, and the Czech Republic, who are not hopeful about the future because of Obama's speeches and promises. He has thrown Israel under the bus and screwed over the Poles and Czechs because he does not want to hack-off Russia, but they counting on having a missile system to shut down possible Iran nukes.

Let us examine Obama's "peace" achievements:

Has Obama successfully undermine US foreign policy and thrown its Allies under the bus? Yes.

Has Obama done anything substantive to bring about any change in the peace situation in the Middle East? No.

Has he done anything substantive to change the peace situation with North Korea? No.

Has he done anything substantive to change the situation with Iran? No.

Or Venezuela? No.

So again I ask, "What has Obama really done to deserve the Nobel Peace Prize?" Appears to me, and even to the Nobel Committee, nothing, but he makes me people feel hopeful. So? It is one thing to give people hope through action, actual substantive actions that result in real positive change, and another thing for someone just to talk about things and make feel hopeful. In my opinion, Obama has done nothing to deserve the Peace Prize because it should be awarded on actual merit, not on how he makes people feel.